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RECENT STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS IN
TEXAS LANDLORD-TENANT LAW: A
SWORD WITHOUT A SHIELD
by Rebecca Hurley
N 1978 the Texas courts precipitated contemporary landlord-tenant
reform by creating an implied warranty of habitability in residential
leasing' and by recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory conduct
against a tenant.2 The Texas Legislature responded in its 1979 session by
enacting House Bill 1773,3 a statute intended to govern the rights and re-
sponsibilities of residential landlords and tenants. Article 5236f codifies
the landlord's duty to repair leased premises and specifies the tenant reme-
dies that are available if the landlord fails to comply. In addition, the
statute proscribes certain forms of retaliatory action by both landlord and
tenant. In defining the respective rights and duties of the lessor and lessee,
the statute both limits and expands upon the judicial decisions that pre-
ceded it.
This Comment traces the common law foundations of the landlord-
tenant relationship from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries, examining
in particular the recent judicial decisions that have changed the focus of
landlord-tenant law from its outmoded origins to a more modern and real-
istic approach. Additionally, this Comment analyzes and discusses the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, as well as the similar stat-
utes enacted in other jurisdictions, comparing them with the recent Texas
legislation. Finally, an analysis and critique of article 5236f is provided,
together with suggestions for interpretation by the courts, use by tenants,
and revision by the legislature.
I. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
A. The Common Law Background
The English feudal economy of the late twelfth century considered the
lease as a purely contractual right.4 The lessee was not entitled to the pro-
1. Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
2. Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ).
3. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 780, §§ 1-17, at 1978-84 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5236f (Vernon Supp. 1980-198 1)).
4. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 106 (2d ed.
1968). The estate for years was uncommon during the feudal period of English legal history.
It was used most frequently as a device for securing the repayment of loans and evading the
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tection afforded by the real actions5 because the leasehold was not re-
garded as an estate in land. 6 He was by definition "one who had no right
in the land, but merely the benefit of a contract."' 7 Over the next three
centuries, however, the remedies of the lessee were gradually improved,
8
and his interest came to be considered as one of the estates in land. 9 The
lease instrument was therefore deemed a conveyance rather than a con-
tract.' 0 From the sixteenth century on, the property theory of leases pre-
vailed; a lease was said to convey a possessory estate in land for a specified
term. I
While parties to a lease ordinarily exchanged mutual promises in the
instrument, the general rule was that the covenants were not mutually de-
pendent.12 A breach of a landlord's covenant to repair, therefore, was not
considered a defense to an action for nonpayment of rent because the two
covenants were independent.' 3 In return for his promise to pay rent, the
tenant received only the right to possess the land. 14 The landlord's part of
the bargain was fulfilled by the mere delivery of possession, provided he
refrained from later interference with the tenant's use and enjoyment of
the premises. 15 In the absence of an express covenant, the landlord had no
obligation to repair the premises prior to the commencement of the lease
term, nor was he required to make any repairs while the tenant was in
possession. 16
The doctrine of caveat emptor was said to justify the rule that the land-
lord had no duty to keep rented premises in repair.17 Presumably the par-
laws of usury. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.1 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Lesar,
Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279 (1960).
5. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.1; 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 73 (3d ed. 1939).
6. See I H. TIFFANY, supra note 5, § 73.
7. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 115.
8. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213-17 (5th ed. 1942). See
generally 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 221[1] (1977).
9. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 8, T 221[].
10. ld See also 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 5, § 73.
11. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.11.
12. Id See generally Comment, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Landlord-
Tenant Relationshos." The Necessity of Application in Texas, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 64, 64-68
(1973).
13. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.11. Various reasons have
been assigned for the refusal of the common law courts to consider such mutual promises
dependent covenants. Because the lease has been regarded primarily as a conveyance and
therefore governed by property law principles, courts have been hesitant to apply the basic
doctrines of contract law. Additionally, the law of property with respect to leaseholds was
well settled before the concept of mutually dependent covenants was developed. 6 S. WIL-
LISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890, at 586-88 (3d ed. 1962). See gener-
ally Lesar, supra note 4, at 1281.
14. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant. A Critical Evaluation of the Past
with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 227 (1969).
15. "Significantly, the landlord was not being paid to do anything .... [He] was not
expected to assist in the operation of the land. Quite the reverse, he was expected to stay as
far away as possible." Id at 228 (emphasis in original).
16. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 8, 233.
17. Id See generally Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Needfor Change, 44
DEN. L.J. 387, 387-94 (1967); Comment, supra note 12, at 65-66; Note, The Implied Warranty
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ties to the lease were engaged in an arm's-length bargaining transaction;
the lessee was expected to examine the premises, determine their suitabil-
ity, and assume all risks as to their condition. 18 This attitude was the prod-
uct of a landowner-dominated, agricultural society in which structures and
improvements were far less important than the land itself.19 The tenant's
only recourse was to secure from his landlord an express covenant to keep
the premises in repair.20 Even if he succeeded in obtaining such an agree-
ment, however, its breach would not relieve the tenant of his responsibility
to pay rent because the two were considered independent covenants. 21
The courts created a few limited exceptions to mitigate the harshness of
the caveat emptor doctrine in leasing transactions. The "furnished house"
exception originated with the English case of Smith v. Marrable,22 in
which the lessee of a furnished house abandoned the premises because
they were bug-infested. The lessee was held to have a defense to an action
for nonpayment of rent on the grounds that a landlord lets a furnished
house under the implied condition that it is fit for occupancy.23 The ap-
parent rationale for the "furnished house" exception to the rule of caveat
emptor was that the parties intended an immediate occupancy of the prem-
ises, without time for any inspection or repairs on the part of the lessee. 24
Other cases protected the lessee if the terms of the lease restricted his use
of the premises, 25 or if he accepted the lease while the premises were under
construction.26 The courts in such situations implied a covenant that the
property would be suitable for the purpose for which it was leased. In JD.
Young Corp. v. McClinic27 the parties executed a commercial lease before
the building was completed. 28 A leaking roof caused water damage to the
lessee's goods, and he sued for cancellation of the lease in addition to dam-
ages. 29 Reciting the general rule that there was no implied covenant on the
part of a landlord that the demised premises were fit for their intended
ofHabitability in Texas- A Development Long Overdue in Texas Landlord-Tenant Law, 16
Hous. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (1978); Note, Recognition ofan Implied Covenant ofHabitability
in Residential Leaseholds: Kamarath v. Bennett, 32 Sw. L.J. 1037, 1037-38 (1978). For a
discussion of the historical development of caveat emptor, see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim
Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
18. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.45; 2 R. POWELL, supra note 8,
233; 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 5, § 99. For a discussion of the doctrine of caveat emptor and
its impact in the area of real estate sales, see Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
19. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 8, 233.
20. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.45.
21. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
22. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
23. Id at 694.
24. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.45. Most of the cases which
follow the rule of Smith v. Marrable have involved short-term leases of furnished premises
under circumstances suggesting that immediate occupancy was intended. See, e.g., Young v.
Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
25. Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938).
26. J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930), rev'd
on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved).
27. Id
28. 26 S.W.2d at 460-61.
29. Id at 461.
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purpose, the .court noted that caveat emptor applies to a building under
construction if it is sufficiently near completion to permit the prospective
tenant to ascertain its suitability for use.30 In the instant case, however,
construction had not progressed far enough for the tenant to inspect the
premises. He was therefore protected by one of the exceptions to the rule
of caveat emptor, and the landlord was held liable for damage to the ten-
ant's goods. 31
The courts also have used the remedy of constructive eviction to allevi-
ate the harshness of the rule of caveat emptor.32 The concept of construc-
tive eviction developed from the theory that a covenant of quiet enjoyment
is implicit in the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship. 33 Breach of
that covenant entitled the lessee to abandon the leased premises and to
cease making rental payments if the landlord's affirmative, wrongful acts
rendered the premises uninhabitable. 34 Constructive eviction, however,
provides the tenant with only limited relief. The tenant is required to va-
cate the premises in order to exercise his remedy, thereby assuming the risk
of liability for accrued rentals should litigation later determine that his
reasons for vacating were inadequate. 35 The abandonment requirement is
particularly inappropriate in light of the realities of modern urban living.
The difficulties of locating alternative housing and financing moving ex-
penses may prevent the tenant from effectively utilizing the constructive
eviction remedy. 36 Perhaps most importantly, constructive eviction in no
way improves the condition of the premises. The tenant simply abandons
his leasehold, and the landlord is not required to repair the alleged de-
fects. 37
The development of exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor38 reflected
an increasing judicial recognition of the concept's lack of practicality. In
light of the social and economic changes that were occurring in both Eng-
land and the United States, the presumptions based on agrarian landlord-
tenant law were recognized as inappropriate and artificial.39 In an effort to
30. Id. at 462.
31. Id.
32. See generally I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.51; 2 R. POWELL,
supra note 8, 225[3]; I H. TIFFANY, supra note 5, § 92; Comment, Constructive Eviction ofa
Tenant, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 62 (1961).
33. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.47.
34. See Comment, supra note 12, at 67.
35. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969); Nabors v. Johnson, 51
S.W.2d 1081, 1082 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932, no writ); see Comment, supra note 12, at
68.
36. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 14, at 234-35.
37. See Comment, supra note 12, at 68.
38. Two other recognized exceptions are worthy of note. The landlord is generally held
responsible for the condition of the common areas of the demised premises as well as any
areas over which he retains control. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.78.
In addition, responsibility for repairs falls on the lessor if the premises are leased with any
fraud, deceit, or wrongdoing on his part. Yarbrough v. Booher, 141 Tex. 420, 174 S.W.2d 47
(1943).
39. Industrial specialization and increasing urbanization have altered radically the
traditional landlord-tenant relationship. The sociological and economic components of this
change are traced in J. LEVI, P. HABLUTZEL, L. ROSENBERG & J. WHITE, MODEL RESIDEN-
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provide an equitable, contemporary solution to the problems inherent in
the landlord-tenant area, the courts began to borrow a concept from the
law of sales: the implied warranty.40
B. Recognition of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Pines v. Perssion4l was a
harbinger of the imminent change in landlord-tenant law. Although the
"furnished house" exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor 42 would have
applied under the facts of the case,43 the court's reasoning rested instead
upon an implied warranty of habitability:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative pol-
icy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of
adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases
is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat
emptor."
In Lemle v. Breeden45 the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized an implied
covenant of habitability based on the contractual relationship between the
parties. The court emphasized that the lease is a sale as well as a transfer
of an estate in land and found that the nature of the transaction as well as
contemporary housing realities necessitated the implication of such a war-
ranty.46 The court continued by noting that such a contractual view of the
lease agreement would afford tenants a more consistent and responsive set
of remedies than those that were provided under traditional property law
principles, because the common contract remedies of damages, rescission,
and reformation would be appropriate. 47
A federal court recognized the implied warranty concept in Javins v.
First National Realty Corp. 48 In Javins the court allowed the lessee to raise
the breach of an implied warranty of habitability as a defense to an action
for nonpayment of rent.49 Using the local housing code as a standard, the
TIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE 6-7 (Tent. Draft 1969). See generally Quinn & Phillips,
supra note 14, at 231-39; Skillern, supra note 17, at 387-94.
40. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). A number of commentators had proposed the application of an implied
warranty of habitability in leases prior to its adoption by the courts. See, e.g., Lesar, supra
note 4; Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CONN. L. REV. 61 (1969); Quinn & Phillips,
supra note 14; Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967);
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966);
Skillern, supra note 17.
41. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
42. Id at 593, 1!1 N.W.2d at 412; see notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
43. The tenants in Pines were students who had leased a dwelling "suitable for student
housing" for a term of one year. Furniture was to be included. 14 Wis. 2d at 593, 111
N.W.2d at 412.
44. Id at 593-94, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
45. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
46. Id at 433, 462 P.2d at 474.
47. Id at 436, 462 P.2d at 475.
48. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
49. 428 F.2d at 1072-73.
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court found that a warranty of habitability was implied, by operation of
law, into urban leases that were subject to the housing regulations.50 Rec-
ognizing that the feudal concepts of property law no longer reflected the
needs of tenants, the court observed that the modem apartment dweller is
more concerned with obtaining shelter and a package of goods and serv-
ices than he is with receiving an interest in land.5' The court compared the
tenant to a consumer and suggested that the rationale for implying warran-
ties of fitness and merchantability in the sales of goods and services ap-
plied with equal force to the leasing of residential premises.52 Examining
the nature of the urban housing market, the court emphasized the inability
of the modern-day tenant to make the necessary complicated repairs53 and
the inequality of bargaining power between landlord and tenant.54 Inte-
grating the terms of the local housing code into the lease agreement, 55 the
court found that the landlord had a legal obligation to provide and main-
tain habitable premises for the tenant's use.5 6
Javins proved to be the landmark case.5 7 A number of state courts have
since followed the lead of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, judi-
cially adopting an implied covenant of habitability in residential leases.58
50. Id
51. Id at 1074.
52. Id at 1075-76. See generally 8 S. WILLISTON, supra note 13, §§ 983-989.
53. 428 F.2d at 1078-79. Unlike the tenant farmer of English common law, the urban
dweller usually possesses a specialized skill unrelated to those required to make apartment
repairs. In addition, the increasing complexity of apartment buildings makes them difficult
to repair in the absence of some expertise in maintenance. Tenants who attempt such re-
pairs could conceivably have problems arranging financing as well as obtaining access to
areas in the landlord's control. Id See also J. LEVI, P. HABLUTZEL, L. ROSENBERG & J.
WHITE, supra note 39, at 6-7.
54. 428 F.2d at 1079. The court noted in particular the increasingly severe shortage of
housing, the use of standardized form leases, and racial and classification discrimination
against tenants as impediments to a lessee's bargaining strength. Id
55. Id at 1080-81.
56. Id at 1082.
57. In one commentary Javins was hailed as the "Miranda decision" of residential evic-
tions. Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 550, 576 (1971).
58. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Old Town Dev. Co.
v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa
1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Heming-
way, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
265 A.2d 526 (1970); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Glyco v.
Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972);
Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658
(Tex. 1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
Not all courts have been receptive to the notion of a judicially imposed covenant of
tenantability. See Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 191 Colo. 344, 558 P.2d 563 (1976), in which the
Colorado Supreme Court stated: "[H]owever desirable the adoption of the rule of implied
warranty of habitability might be, the resolution of this issue is more properly the function
of the General Assembly." 558 P.2d at 565. See also Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172,
174 N.W.2d 528 (1970) (no intention that housing code should be implied covenant mutu-




The state cases generally have relied on the factors that the Javins court
cited. Some courts have modeled their decisions after Javins by incorpo-
rating into the lease the provisions of local housing, health, and safety
laws. 59 Regardless of the rationale embraced by the particular court, how-
ever, the implied covenant of habitability warrants the suitability of the
premises as living quarters; it is breached if the premises are unsafe, un-
sanitary, or otherwise unfit. 60 Tenant remedies that are allowed for such a
breach 6' have included termination of the lease,62 damages, 63 rent abate-
ment,64 rent application, 65 and rent withholding.66
C Retaliatory Action by the Landlord
While the development of the implied warranty of habitability substan-
tially improved the lot of the modem apartment dweller, it did not provide
a complete answer to the tenant's problems. Under a short-term or month-
to-month rental agreement, a landlord has the right to evict his tenant
merely by providing the specified statutory notice; he need not furnish any
reason for the eviction.67 The landlord's liberal right of removal has been
used in retaliation against tenants who have attempted to protect their
rights by reporting housing code violations and breaches of the implied
covenant of habitability. 68 In order to protect a tenant's right to a tenanta-
59. See, e.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v.
Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974). See
also Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (housing code violations merely
evidence of uninhabitability). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1, Comment e
(1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] ("A significant violation of any controlling build-
ing or sanitary code, or similar public regulation, which has a substantial impact upon safety
or health, is conclusive that the premises are unsafe or unhealthy, but other modes of proof
are acceptable.").
60. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 83 (1973); Kline
v. Bums, Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
61. The Restatement would allow a variety of remedies, including termination of the
lease, damages, rent abatement, and rent withholding. RESTATEMENT, supra note 59,
§§ 5.1, .4.
62. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
63. See, e.g., Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Kline v. Bums, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
64. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831
(1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania
Mun. Ct. 1971).
65. See, e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
66. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
67. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 8, 225[2][b]. For a discussion of the common law back-
ground of the landlord's absolute right to evict holdover tenants, see Note, Retaliatory Evic-
tions." Review & Reform, I N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 81, 85-87 (1971).
68. See generally I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 3.78 (Supp. 1977); 2
R. POWELL, supra note 8, 225[2][b]; Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in Caliornia: A Study
in Frustration, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 296-97 (1970); McElhaney, Retaliatory Evictions.:
Landlords, Tenants and Law Reform, 29 MD. L. REV. 193, 217-25 (1969); Note, Retaliatory
Evictions- .4 Study of Existing Law and Proposed Model Code, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 537
(1969).
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ble dwelling, courts have created the doctrine of retaliatory eviction, which
may be used as a defense by the tenant in an eviction action.
In the leading case of Edwards v. Habib69 the tenant, Edwards, rented
residential housing from Habib on a month-to-month basis. When the
landlord failed to repair the housing code violations that she had reported,
Edwards complained to the Department of Licenses and Inspections. Sub-
sequent investigation revealed over forty housing code violations, and the
department ordered the landlord to correct them. The landlord then gave
Edwards the required statutory notice to vacate and obtained a default
judgment that granted him possession of the premises. A lengthy procedu-
ral battle ensued, in which Edwards alleged that the notice to quit was a
direct retaliation for her complaints to the housing authorities. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately determined that
proof of retaliatory motive on the part of a landlord constituted a valid
defense in an eviction proceeding.70
Although the court devoted a large part of its opinion to an examination
of constitutional issues raised by the tenant,7' the holding of the case rested
on public policy considerations. Taking judicial notice of the housing
problems in the District of Columbia, 72 the court recognized that the local
housing code embodied a strong congressional policy in favor of safe and
adequate housing.73 The court stated that "while the landlord may evict
for any legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not . . . free to evict in
retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to the authori-
ties."'74 Allowing retaliatory evictions would neutralize the effectiveness of
housing regulations, which depend on private reporting by tenants for
their enforcement. 75 The tenant, therefore, should be allowed to present
evidence of the landlord's retaliatory intentions as a defense in an eviction
proceeding. 76
Following the Edwards decision, tenant requests for legal protection
69. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
70. Id at 690.
71. Id at 690-98. The tenant had argued that the eviction abridged her right of free
speech under the first amendment, but the court declined to reach the constitutional issues.
Id at 690. See Note, supra note 67, at 91-94. Nevertheless, some subsequent decisions have
been based upon the Edwards court's discussion of the first amendment implications of re-
taliatory eviction. See, e.g., E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d
544 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, Reporter's Note
§ 14.9, item lc, at 76-80 (1977); McElhaney, supra note 68, at 223-25.
An alternative constitutional defense asserted by the tenant was based upon the citizen's
right to petition the government and report violations of the law. 397 F.2d at 696. See In re
Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895). Again, however, the court refused to rest its decison
on constitutional grounds. 397 F.2d at 699.
72. 397 F.2d at 700.
73. Id
74. Id at 699.
75. Id at 700-01.
76. Id at 690. The court cautioned that proof of retaliatory purpose on the part of the
landlord does not give the tenant an unlimited right to possession. The court indicated that
once the illegal purpose has dissipated, the landlord may evict his tenants or raise their rents
for any legitimate reason or for no reason at all. Id at 702.
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from a landlord's retaliatory action became more common. State courts
began to adopt the defense of retaliatory eviction, relying on the public
policy rationale advanced by the Edwards court, that to permit the land-
lord's retaliatory conduct would frustrate the purposes of local housing
laws. 77 Other decisions have enunciated constitutional bases for the doc-
trine of retaliatory eviction, similar to those asserted by the tenant in Ed-
wards.78 While the courts most often have allowed the tenant to use
retaliatory eviction as an affirmative defense in eviction actions,79 other
remedies "may be available. Some cases have held that a court may enjoin
the landlord from evicting a tenant if his motives are shown to be retalia-
tory,80 or have permitted the evicted tenant to recover damages.81
D. Landlord and Tenant Law in Texas
Until recently, Texas courts steadfastly adhered to the common law doc-
trines that governed the landlord-tenant relationship. A long line of Texas
cases recited the rule that, in the absence of fraud or deceit, there is no
implied warranty on the part of a lessor that the leased premises are suited
for their intended use.8 2 While maintaining the strict principle of caveat
emptor, however, the Texas courts gradually narrowed its application
through a number of exceptions similar to those adopted in other jurisdic-
tions.83 Texas did not join the growing number of states that have adopted
the theories of implied warranty of habitability and retaliatory eviction
until 1978.
77. See, e.g., Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970); Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ);
Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
78. See note 71 supra.
79. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
80. See, e.g., E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971); Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe
County Ct. 1972).
81. See, e.g., Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct.
1972).
82. Yarbrough v. Booher, 141 Tex. 420, 174 S.W.2d 47 (1943); Morton v. Burton-Lingo
Co., 136 Tex. 263, 150 S.W.2d 239 (1941); Perez v. Raybaud, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177
(1890); Lynch v. Ortlieb, 70 Tex. 727, 8 S.W. 515 (1888); Weinstein v. Harrison, 66 Tex. 546,
1 S.W. 626 (1886); Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Distrib. Co., 442 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1969, no writ); Jackson v. Amador, 75 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1934, writ dism'd); Weiss v. Mitchell, 58 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Daflas 1933, writ
dism'd). A number of these cases, however, involved leases of property designed for com-
mercial use. See Perez v. Raybaud, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 (1890); Lynch v. Ortlieb, 70
Tex. 727, 8 S.W. 515 (1888); Weinstein v. Harrison, 66 Tex. 546, 1 S.W. 626 (1886); Cameron
v. Calhoun-Smith Distrib. Co., 442 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ);
Jackson v. Amador, 75 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, writ dism'd); Weiss v.
Mitchell, 58 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, writ dism'd). Even today the appli-
cation of the implied warranty of habitability generally has been limited to residential
leases. The Restatement (Second) of Property takes no position on whether the concept
should be extended to leases of commercial or industrial property. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 59, §§ 5.1, .5.
83. See notes 22-37 supra and accompanying text. For a complete analysis of the Texas
exceptions to caveat emptor see Comment, supra note 12, at 71-82.
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The Texas Supreme Court recognized the concept of an implied cove-
nant of habitability in Kamarath v. Bennett.84 Kamarath, the tenant, held
property pursuant to an oral month-to-month lease. A number of serious
defects in the condition of the premises became apparent after the tenant
and his family began to occupy the apartment. When city building inspec-
tors surveyed the property and observed the defects, they notified the land-
lord either to repair or to vacate the premises. Instead, the landlord gave
Kamarath notice to vacate. The tenant ceased paying rent and moved out
a short time later. He then brought an action for damages against his land-
lord, alleging breach of an implied warranty of habitability in urban resi-
dential rental property.85 The Texas Supreme Court held in favor of the
tenant, implying into rentals of residential property a warranty by the
landlord that the premises are habitable and fit for living.86 The court
imposed the warranty for public policy reasons,8 7 finding that such a cove-
nant arises out of the nature of the lease transaction and the landlord-
tenant relationship by operation of law.88 According to the court, any de-
fect that would render the premises unsafe, unsanitary, or otherwise unfit
for living would constitute a breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.89 The court enumerated eight factors to be considered in determining
whether a breach had occurred, including:
The nature of the deficiency, its effect on habitability, the length of
time for which it persisted, the age of the structure, the amount of
rent, the area in which the premises are located, whether the tenant
waived the defects, and whether the defects resulted from malicious,
abnormal, or unusual use by the tenant.90
One month after the Kamarath decision, the Dallas court of civil ap-
peals addressed another contemporary development in landlord-tenant
law, the doctrine of retaliatory eviction. In Sims v. Century Kiest Apart-
84. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). For a discussion of Kamarath, see Bentley, Real Prop-
erty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 31, 89-90 (1979); Note, The Implied Warranty
of Habitability in Texas: A Development Long Overdue in Texas Landlord-Tenant Law, 16
Hous. L. REV. 225 (1978); Note, Recognition of an Implied Covenant of Habitability in Resi-
dential Leaseholds." Kamarath v. Bennett, 32 Sw. L.J. 1037 (1978).
85. Id The tenant in Kamarath used the asserted warranty as an offensive maneuver,
seeking affirmative relief. In Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), the lessee used breach of the implied warranty as a defense
to an eviction action. The Kamarath court did not discuss the possible defensive use of the
implied warranty.
86. 568 S.W.2d at 660-61. The court cited a number of similar decisions from other
jurisdictions in support of its holding.
87. Id at 660. The court listed several factors that were crucial to its decision. First, the
court found that state legislation granting cities the power to adopt housing ordinances con-
stituted recognition of a legislative concern for safe and adequate housing. Additionally, the
court recognized that the modem landlord's knowledge of the condition of the premises is
superior to that of his tenant. Finally, because the landlord actually owns the property, the
court reasoned he should bear the cost of making the necessary repairs. Id
88. Id at 661.
89. Id
90. Id See also Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
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menis91 the tenant Sims had made repeated complaints to the manage-
ment of his apartment complex about the deteriorating condition of the
property. He also had helped to organize a tenants' council and had re-
ported housing, health, and building code violations to the city authorities.
Although his rent was fully paid, he received written notice to vacate his
apartment, and the landlord rejected his tender of future rental payments.
The landlord filed suit for forcible entry and detainer 92 and recovered pos-
session of the premises, 93 whereupon Sims brought suit for damages for
retaliatory eviction.94
Relying primarily on the decision in Edwards v. Habib,95 the court held
that a cause of action for retaliatory eviction does exist in Texas.96 "[I]f
the evidence shows that the tenant probably would not have been evicted
had he not reported violations of regulations enacted for his benefit," the
court stated, "then such an eviction is an affirmative wrong for which an
action for damages will lie in favor of the aggrieved tenant. ' 97 The court
based its holding on the public policy implicit in state statutes and local
ordinances and did not confront the constitutional issues of freedom of
speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of petition for redress of griev-
ances.98 While recognizing the landlord's common law and statutory
power to terminate a tenancy, the court determined that the power should
not grant the landlord a legal right to evict in retaliation for the tenant's
report of housing violations. In the court's view the controlling principle
was "the policy against intimidation or coercion that would discourage or
inhibit reports of violations of the law by persons for whose benefit the law
has been enacted." 99
With the decisions in Kamarath and Sims, Texas courts designed two
new remedies to provide tenants with more adequate housing facilities.
Nearly a decade after the landmark holdings in Javins and Edwards, Texas
courts acknowledged the realities of the modem landlord-tenant relation-
ship and the obsolescence of the doctrine of caveat emptor. While
91. 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ). For a discussion of Sims,
see Bentley, supra note 84, at 96-98.
92. A tenant who fails to deliver possession of the premises when the lease terminates
may be dispossessed by the person entitled to possession in an action for forcible detainer.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3973-3994 (Vernon 1966).
93. 567 S.W.2d at 527-28.
94. Id at 527. The Sims case involved offensive use of retaliatory eviction principles;
the tenant sought affirmative relief in the form of damages. In Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d
687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969), retaliatory eviction was asserted as a
defense in an eviction proceeding. The Sims court "[did] not go so far as to hold that [retali-
atory eviction] would constitute a defense in forcible detainer." 567 S.W.2d at 532.
95. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
96. 567 S.W.2d at 527.
97. Id at 532.
98. Id Like the Edwards court, however, the Sims court devoted considerable attention
to the matter. Id at 529-30.
99. Id at 531. The court cautioned that its holding was a narrow one. The retaliatory
eviction principle was not to be extended to a case in which the tenant's complaints were not
made in good faith. Furthermore, if the landlord has some affirmative ground for eviction,
such as nonpayment of rent, the retaliatory eviction cause of action should not be recog-
nized. Id at 532.
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Kamarath and Sims were important statements of public policy, they left
many questions I°° for judicial resolutions.10'
II. RECENT STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF THE
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) had its
origin in an American Bar Foundation research project. 10 2 The project
produced a tentative draft of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code (MRLTC), a document that was intended primarily as a basis for
discussion rather than for adoption as a model act. !0 3 In 1970 a subcom-
mittee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws continued the research that the American Bar Foundation had initi-
ated. The subcommittee's efforts culminated in the drafting of the
URLTA, which the American Bar Association adopted in February
1974.104 Thirteen states now have adopted the legislative package of re-
forms contained in the URLTA with some variation. 0 5
100. Among the issues left unresolved by Kamarath and Sims was the waiver of the
implied warranty of habitability. Compare Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.) (indicating that the implied warranty could not be waived), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970), with Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 n.2 (Tex. 1978) ("our holding
should not be construed to mean that a tenant may not, by express agreement, waive the
warranty of habitability"). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, §§ 5.1, .4-.5 ("except to
the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise").
The Kamarath court also failed to consider the issue of damages for breach of the implied
warranty, as well as the question of its use as a defense. See note 85 supra. The Sims court
left open the possible use of retaliatory eviction as a defense. See note 94 supra. The prob-
lem of proving a landlord's retaliatory motive was also unaddressed.
101. Prior to any judicial interpretations of Kamarath and Sims, the Texas Legislature
passed a statute that superseded those decisions. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f
(Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see notes 155-205 infra and accompanying text.
102. Principal financial support for the project was provided by the Office of Economic
Opportunity. J. LEVI, P. HABLUTZEL, L. ROSENBERG & J. WHITE, supra note 39, at 3.
103. Id. at I. For commentary on the proposed model code, see Gibbons, Residential
Landlord- Tenant Law A Survey of Modern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model
Code, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (1970).
104. See Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLT4. A Programfor Achieving Tenant Goals,
II HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (1976); Comment, The Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act.- Effect ofAdoption on Calfornia Law, 4 PAC. L.J. 788 (1973). For further
commentary on URLTA, see Levi, New Landlord-Tenant Legal Relations-The Model Land-
lord-Tenant Code, 3 URB. L. 592 (1971); Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant
Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 550 (1971); Subcommittee on the
Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 104 (1973); Note, The Uniform Residen-
tial Landlord and Tenant Act.- Facilitation of or Impediment to Reform Favorable to the
Tenant?, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845 (1974).
105. The statutes of the respective URLTA jurisdictions are as follows: ALASKA STAT.
§§ 34.03.010-.380 (1975 & Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1301 to -1381 (1974 &
Supp. 1980-1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.63 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§§ 521-1 to -78 (1976 & Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 562A.1-.37 (West Supp. 1980-
1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to -2573 (1976 & Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT.
§§ 383.505-.715 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 70-24-101 to -442 (1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 76-1401 to -1449 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-1 to -51 (1978); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 91.700-.865 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2801 to -2864 (1976 & Supp. 1980);
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The URLTA incorporates a number of basic fair treatment and decent
housing protections, including the warranty of habitability and protection
against retaliatory action by landlords. Section 2.104 contains the basic
warranty provisions of the statute.' 0 6 One important feature of section
2.104 is an enumeration of the landlord's maintenance responsibilities.
The URLTA requires the landlord to comply with all applicable building
and housing codes that materially affect health and safety. He must also
put and keep the premises in fit and habitable condition, make all neces-
sary repairs, and keep common areas clean and safe. In addition, the land-
lord must provide and maintain appropriate and necessary services, such
as water, heat, electricity, and garbage removal.' 0 7
The URLTA permits landlords and tenants of single family dwellings to
agree to their own maintenance arrangements, subject to a good faith re-
quirement. The agreements are not allowed if they are made "for the pur-
pose of evading the obligations of the landlord."' 10 8 Similar agreements
are permitted between landlords and tenants in multiple-unit dwellings,
subject to some additional restrictions. 109
A variety of tenant remedies for breach of the implied warranty are
available through the URLTA."I0 If a landlord's noncompliance with the
Act's warranty provisions materially affects health and safety, the tenant
may receive damages, seek injunctive relief, or terminate his lease. The
availability of these remedies, however, is predicated upon the tenant's
compliance with the statutory notice provision. " I1 For a landlord's wrong-
ful failure to provide essential services as required by section 2.104, the
tenant is allowed to recover damages, use rent application procedures,' 12
or suspend rental payments."13 When the landlord initiates an action for
rent or possession based on nonpayment of rent, the tenant may counter-
claim for damages resulting from the landlord's breach."14 If the premises
VA. CODE §§ 55-248.2 to .40 (Supp. 1980). For a recent evaluation of URLTA as it has been
ap lied in Ohio and Oregon, see Brakel & McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act (URLTA) in Operation.: Two Reports, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J.
555.
106. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104.
107. Id § 2.104(a).
108. Id § 2.104(c).
109. Id § 2.104(d). In order for a substituted maintenance agreement to be valid, it must
be entered into in good faith and set forth in a separate written document supported by
adequate consideration. The maintenance that is the subject of the agreement must not be
necessary to achieve compliance with the housing codes. Finally, the agreement must not
affect the rights of other tenants. Id
110. Seeid §§4.101, .107.
111. Id §§ 4. 101(a)-(b). Variable notice provisions are provided by the drafters.
112. Id §§ 4.104(a)(l)-(2). Application of rent upon a landlord's default is a tenant's
self-help remedy. The tenant, after proper notice to the landlord, is permitted to apply his
rent to eliminate the default and then deduct from his rent the reasonable costs incurred.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 11.2, Comment a. See also UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.103.
113. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.104(a)(3) allows the ten-
ant to obtain substitute housing and cease making rental payments for the duration of the
landlord's default.
114. Id § 4.105. Section 4.105 also establishes the remedy of rent withholding or rent
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are damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty, rent abatement is per-
mitted."l 5
Although the remedies that the URLTA provides far exceed those avail-
able at common law, noticeable shortcomings exist. The statute neither
mandates repair of the premises through a provision for specific perform-
ance nor enables the tenant to finance such repairs. Furthermore, the rent
abatement and damage provisions essentially shift the repair obligation
from the landlord to the tenant and ignore the compensatory nature of the
awards."l 6 Mechanisms such as receivership, retroactive rent abatement,
landlord security deposits, and tenant-mortgage negotiating may provide
further reform in the future. 17
Among the fair treatment provisions of the URLTA is a prohibition
against retaliatory conduct by the landlord." 81 The URLTA shields the
tenant from landlord retaliation in the form of increased rent, decreased
services, or actual or threatened suits for possession.' 19 The Act protects
tenant activities such as complaints to either the landlord 2 0 or government
authorities 121 with regard to the condition of the premises, tenant organiz-
ing, and tenant union membership. 122 The Act also creates a presumption
of the landlord's retaliatory motive if his conduct occurs within a year of
any of the protected activities. 123 The URLTA does recognize limited ex-
ceptions to the retaliatory eviction action; under certain circumstances the
landlord may lawfully bring a possessory action.'2 4 Affirmative tenant
remedies for a landlord's retaliatory conduct include termination of the
escrow. The court may require the tenant to deposit unpaid and accruing rent into the court
pending the outcome of the case. Courts have not favored this practice because it discour-
ages the use of other remedies for breach of the warranty of habitability. See Cooks v.
Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir.
1970). Contra, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n.67 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
115. "The tenant's liability for rent is reduced in proportion of the diminution in the fair
rental value of the dwelling unit." UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
§ 4.106(a)(2); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 11.1.
116. The economic sanction of prospective rent abatement may not induce the landlord
to make repairs if the capitalized repair expenses exceed the capitalized cost of continued
rent abatement. The tenant thus may be forced to finance repairs from available money
damages, savings from rent abatements, and his own income. See Blumberg & Robbins,
supra note 104, at 11.
117. For a comprehensive analysis of these suggested reforms in the URLTA's implied
warranty provisions, see Blumberg & Robbins, supra note 104, at 22-39.
118. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 5.101. The URLTA also
addresses the landlord's distress and distraint remedy (1d § 4.205) and the use of security
deposits (Id § 2.101).
119. Id § 5.101(a).
120. Id. § 5.101(a)(2).
121. Id § 5.101(a)(1).
122. Id § 5.101(a)(3).
123. Id. § 5.101(b). "Presumption" is a defined term under the URLTA. The trier of
fact is required to find the existence of the presumed fact unless evidence is admitted that
would support a contrary finding. The presumption of retaliation does not arise if the ten-
ant's complaint was made after notice of a proposed rent increase or diminution of services.
Id.
124. Id § 5.10 1(c). If the tenant defaults on his rent or causes the code violation himself,
the landlord's action is considered lawful. Further, the landlord may evict if compliance
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lease, recovery of possession, and damages. 125 The URLTA also autho-
rizes a defense that is based upon the retaliatory action in any suit for
possession. 126
As with the implied warranty provisions, the retaliatory conduct
prohibitions are helpful but incomplete. The difficult task of proving retal-
iatory intent on the part of the landlord is alleviated by the statutory pre-
sumption of intent, but the provision arguably only postpones the
retaliation. The categories of protected tenant activities should be broad-
ened. Perhaps other forms of landlord retaliation should be proscribed in
order to protect better the tenant's rights.
127
B. Other State Statutes 128
Many states recently have enacted comprehensive residential landlord-
tenant statutes. While language and style vary, the purpose of the new
wave of legislation is uniform: the encouragement of proper maintenance
and operation of residential properties in compliance with health and
safety standards.
The majority of the states now have statutes requiring the landlord to
put leased premises into a condition fit for their intended use. 129 In addi-
with the code would require alterations or remodeling that would deprive the tenant of use
of the premises. Id
125. Seeid § 4.107.
126. Id § 5.101(b).
127. For example, tenant organization and union membership arguably should be in-
cluded as protected activities. See Blumberg & Robbins, supra note 104, at 16, 39-44.
128. For commentary on the landlord-tenant statutes of other states, see the following:
California-Comment, The Uniform Residential Landlord And Tenant Act: Effect of
Adoption on Calfornia Law, 4 PAC. L.J. 788 (1973); Florida-Boyer & Amato, Up From
Feudalism-Florida's New Residential Leasing Act, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 115 (1973);
Kansas-Tacha, Survey of Kansas Law: Real and Personal Property, 27 U. KAN. L. REV.
283, 296-97 (1979); Legislative Survey, The New Kansas Landlord-Tenant Act, 15
WASHBURN L.J. 202 (1976); Maryland-Davison, The Unform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act and Its Potential Effects Upon Maryland Landlord-Tenant Law, 5 U. BALT. L.
REV. 247 (1976); Michigan-Comment, The New Michigan Landlord-Tenant Law.- Partial
Answer to a Perplexing Problem, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 836 (1969); Nebraska-Kalish, The
Nebraska Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 54 NEB. L. REV. 603 (1975); New Mexico-
Survey of Developments in New Mexico Law-The Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act, 6
N.M.L. REV. 293 (1976); North Carolina-Fillette, North Carolina's Residential Rental
Agreements Act. New Developments for Contract and Tort Liability in Landlord-Tenant
Relations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 785 (1978); Ohio-Baillis, Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act of 1974, 3
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 122 (1975); Note, Reformation of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship in
Ohio, 4 CAP. U.L. REV. 258 (1975); South Dakota-Wolff, A Balancing Act. Strengthening
South Dakota's Landlord-Tenant Law, 22 S.D.L. REV. 15 (1977); Tennessee-Note, An
Overview of the Tennessee Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 109
(1976); Washington-Survey of Washington Law-Property, 9 GONz. L. REV. 299 (1973).
129. The various states' statutes are: ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.090,.100,.160 (1975); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1323, -1324, -1361 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1932, 1941, 1941.1,
1942, 1942.1 (West 1954 & Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47a-4, -5, -12 (1979); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5303-5305 (1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 5-501, -616 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1978-1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.51, .56 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 61-
111 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 521-42, -62, -63 (1976 & Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 562A.14, .15, .21 (West Supp. 1980-1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2552, -2553, -2559
(1976 & Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 383.590, .595, .625 (Supp. 1980); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. arts. 2672, 2693, 2695, 2729 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980);
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tion, the statutes ordinarily impose upon the landlord a duty to repair any
defects that may arise or be discovered during the lease term. If the land-
lord defaults in his obligation to repair, the tenant may have any one or
more of a number of remedies available to him.
Statutory remedies for breach of the landlord's duty to maintain the
premises differ widely. In a number of states the tenant has the right to
terminate the lease upon default by the landlord. 130 The right to seek
damages is another common form of relief.13 1 A number of jurisdictions
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127L
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.139 (Supp.
1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 70-24-
302, -303, -406 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1418, -1419, -1425 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 118A.280, .290, .350 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-20, -28, -29 (Supp. 1980); N.Y.
MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 78, 80 (McKinney 1974); N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 174 (McKin-
ney 1952); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 42-42, -44 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-13, -13.1, -17 (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04, .06, .07 (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31, 32 (West
1954); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.770, .800 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16 (1969); S.D. COMp.
LAWS ANN. §§ 43-32-8, -9, -19 (1967 & Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2823, -2824, -
2841 (1976 & Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 55-248.13, .21 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 59.18.060-.090, .230, .360 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (Supp. 1980).
130. The following statutes deal with the tenant's right to terminate the lease upon the
landlord's default: ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.040, .100, .160 (1975 & Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1315, -1324, -1361 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1932, 1941, 1941.1, 1941.2,
1942, 1942.1 (West 1954 & Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47a-12, -14 (1979); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5303-5305, 5307 (1975 & Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 5-501,
-616 (1966 & Supp. 1978-1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.47, .51, .56 (Supp. 1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 61-111 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 521-31, -62, -63 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN.§§ 562A.21, .25, .26 (West Supp. 1980-1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2547, -2559, -2563
(1976 & Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 383.570, .595, .625 (Supp. 1980); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. arts. 2693, 2716, 2729 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127L (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 70-24-406, -410, -411 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1415, -1419, -1425
(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 118A.350, .390 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-27, -32 (Supp.
1980); N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 174 (McKinney 1952); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-13, -13.1, -17 (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04, .06, .07 (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 121 (West
Supp. 1980-1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.745, .700, .800, .815 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-
18-16 (1969); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 43-32-8, -9, -19 (1967 & Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 64-2813, -2824, -2841, -2844 (1976 & Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 55-248.9, .13, .21,
.26 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.060-.090, .230, .360 (Supp. 1981); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West Pam. Supp. 1980).
131. A number of statutes specifically give the tenant the remedy of damages. See:
ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.180, .210 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1361, -1364, -1367
(1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-13 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5305 (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 83.55 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-63 (1976); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31.1-12.1; ch. 34, § 423.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58-2559, -2563 (1976 & Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 383.625, .640 (Supp. 1980);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 19 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 504.26 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 70-24-406 to -408, -410, -411
(1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1425, -1427, -1430 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 118A.350-
.390, .410 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-6, -27, -32 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§§ 234, 235 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.12, .15 (Page
Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 121, 124 (West Supp. 1980-1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 91.800, .805, .815 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2841, -2842, -2844 (1976 & Supp.
1980); VA. CODE §§ 55-248.21, .23, .26 (Supp. 1980).
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have approved some method of rent abatement by which the tenant is al-
lowed to reduce the amount of the rental payment in proportion to the loss
of rental value of the premises. 132 Rent abatement primarily is allowed
when the premises have suffered from casualty destruction. Rent applica-
tion, another potential remedy for the aggrieved tenant, permits the tenant
to repair defects himself and to deduct the expenses from his rental pay-
ments; the "repair and deduct" procedure has become a popular self-help
maneuver. 133 Some statutes allow the tenant to suspend rental payments
under limited circumstances; 134 others provide for a rent withholding
mechanism whereby the tenant continues to pay rent to another party
(usually the court) pending resolution of the landlord-tenant dispute. 135
132. Rent abatement is allowed by the following statutes: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.190,
.200 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1366 (Supp. 1980-1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-
13 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5307-5308 (1975 & Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 83.56 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-65 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 562A.25 (West Supp. 1980-1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2562 (1976); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
arts. 2697, 2700 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 111, § 127L (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.25 (West Supp.
1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-409 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1429 (1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.400 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-29 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5321.07 (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 122 (West Supp. 1980-1981);
VA. CODE § 55-226 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.060-.080, .l10 (Supp. 1981); W.
VA. CODE § 37-6-28 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West Pam. Supp. 1980).
133. Statutes allowing rent application fall into three groups. One group of laws pro-
vides for a simple "repair and deduct" remedy, while others have a very carefully detailed
procedure. A third set of statutes provides for rent application only upon court order.
The following are the simplified rent application statutes: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.180
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1364 (Supp. 1980-1981); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West
Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-13 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 62 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1980-1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.23 (West Supp. 1980-1981); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 383.640 (Supp. 1980); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2694 (West 1952); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 70-24-406 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1427 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.380
(1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-16-13 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 121 (West Supp. 1980-1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 91.805 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-32-9 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-
2842 (Supp. 1980).
Detailed procedures for rent application are provided by the following state laws: ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1363 (Supp. 1980-1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5306 (1975); HA-
WAII REV. STAT. § 521-64 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.635 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 11, § 127L (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.060-
.080, .100 (Supp. 1981).
In the following statutes, rent application is available only upon court order: MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 566.25 (West Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07 (Page Supp. 1980); VA.
CODE § 55-248.29 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.110 (Supp. 1981).
134. The remedy of rent suspension is provided by the following statutes: ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.03.180 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1364 (Supp. 1980-1981); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 47a-5, -13 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5307 (1975 & Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 83.56 (West Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 413.106 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 383.640 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-408 (1979); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-1427 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.380 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-6 (West
1940); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney 1974); N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 305-
a (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 122 (West Supp. 1980-1981);
OR. REV. STAT. § 91.805 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2842 (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 55-
248.23 (Supp. 1980).
135. The following statutes codify some system of rent withholding: ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.03.190 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1365 (Supp. 1980-1981); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7-148d, 19-347k to -3471 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5901-5908 (1975); FLA. STAT.
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Legislation that prohibits retaliatory action by the landlord also differs
from one jurisdiction to another. Most statutes enumerate certain acts of
the landlord that are forbidden in retaliation for tenant activities. 136 Pro-
tected tenant activities may include enforcement of a lessee's rights under
his lease, 137 enforcement of a tenant's legal rights, 38 tenant complaints to
ANN. § 83.60 (West Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.24 (West Supp. 1980-1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2561 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.645 (Supp. 1980); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127A-127K
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 566.20-.33 (West Supp.
1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.500-.640 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 70-24-421 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1428 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 1 18A.490 (1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-74 to -92 (West Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW
§§ 302-a, 309 (McKinney 1974); N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 305-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTS. §§ 769-782 (McKinney 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.07 (Page Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.810 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-
1 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24.3-19 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-
32-9 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-5501 to -5507 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 4859 (1973); VA. CODE § 55-248.25 (Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.22 (1977). Con-
ira, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44 (Supp. 1979) (rent withholding explicitly prohibited by stat-
ute). See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d (Supp. 1979) (allowing nonhabitabdity of
the premises as a defense in possessory action); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44 (Supp. 1979) (pro-
viding for "general remedies" without enumeration); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (1966) (listing
no specific remedies).
136. The retaliatory action statutes generally forbid a landlord to increase rent, decrease
services, or bring or threaten to bring a suit for possession of the premises. See ALASKA
STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5
(West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-20 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516
(1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-1654 (West Supp. 1978-1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-
74 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.36
(West Supp. 1980-1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705
(Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-
208.1 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 566.03 (Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-431 (1979); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-1439 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 540.13-a, -b (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (West Supp. 1980-1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-39 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-b (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02
(Page Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10 to -11
(1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2854 (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1980); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250 (Supp. 1981).
137. In some states the landlord's exercise of his rights is deemed retaliatory if his moti-
vation is to penalize the tenant's enforcement of rights under the lease: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 566.03 (Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (West Supp. 1980-1981); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10, -11 (1969).
138. Some statutory provisions protect the tenant's enforcement of his legal rights other
than those in the lease: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942.5 (West
Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-20 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-1654 (West
Supp. 1978-1979); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (Supp. 1981);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (West Supp.
1980-1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-37.1 (Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10, -11 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-
2854 (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250
(Supp. 1981).
19811 COMMENTS
the landlord 139 or government authorities, 40 or tenant involvement in an
organization of tenants.' 4 ' Most statutes also contain exceptions to the re-
taliatory eviction provisions, allowing the landlord to act in certain speci-
fied circumstances.' 42 The statutes uniformly permit the tenant to use
retaliatory conduct as an affirmative defense to the landlord's suit for pos-
session. Some statutes also entitle the tenant to damages.143
139. A tenant's complaints to the landlord may not serve as the basis for retaliatory con-
duct under the following state laws: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); CONN. GEN. LAWS § 47a-20 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516
(1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1980-
198 1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp.. 1980); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-431
(1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (Supp. 1979); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Page Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 64-2854 (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1980).
140. A number of statutes protect the tenant's complaint of a violation of a health, safety,
or housing law: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-20 (1979); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516 (1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1980-1981); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 6001 (1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (Supp.
1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-43f (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 541:13-a, -b (Supp. 1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (West Supp. 1980-1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-39
(Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02 (Page Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865
(1979); PA. STAT ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-20-10 to -11
(1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2854 (1979); VA. CODE § 55-248-39 (Supp. 1980); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250 (Supp. 1981).
141. If the landlord's action is taken in response to a tenant's involvement in a tenant
organization, the following statutes afford protection: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-20 (1979); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1980-1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (1980); MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-431 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439
(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.510 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540.13-a, -b (Supp.
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (West Supp. 1980-1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-8-39 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAWS § 230 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02-.03 (Page Supp.
1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1979); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1980).
142. Some states recognize certain conditions as exceptions to the retaliatory action stat-
utes. The exceptional considerations vary among the jurisdictions. ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.03.310 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5
(West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-20 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516
(1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-74 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 526A.36 (West Supp. 1980-
1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1980); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1981); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 70-24-431 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 540:13-a, -b (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-39 (Supp. 1980); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02-.03 (Page Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 53-5505, 64-2854 (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250 (Supp. 1981).
143. The following statutes allow the tenant to recover damages as compensation for the
landlord's retaliatory action: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1381 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2572 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp.
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III. ARTICLE 5236f: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF LANDLORDS AND
TENANTS IN TEXAS
A. Legislative and Judicial Background
Until 1973 Texas tenants had little statutory protection against abuse by
their landlords. In that year, however, a consumer-oriented legislature en-
acted a number of reforms that attempted to equalize the landlord-tenant
relationship. 144 Provisions that dealt with tenant security deposits, 145 util-
ity shut-offs, 146 and landlord's liens147 were included in the new laws.
During the following legislative session, the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act' 48 was amended to include real property
purchased or leased for consumer use within the definition of "goods."' 149
Despite the importance of these measures, Texas tenants still lacked the
remedies of implied warranty of habitability and the retaliatory eviction
ban, which other jurisdictions were rapidly adopting. 150 A number of bills
were introduced during the sixty-fifth Legislature in an attempt to rectify
the situation, but none was enacted.' 5' Within the context of this statutory
vacuum, the 1978 decisions in Kamarath v. Bennett' 52 and Sims v. Century
Kiest Apartments153 provided the impetus for landlord-tenant reform. 154
Within a year following Kamarath and Sims, however, the legislature
enacted a new statute designed to govern the rights and duties of landlords
and tenants. 15 5 While the Texas law is not as comprehensive as the
URLTA or the laws of some states, it does include some significant and
necessary reforms. The law both codifies and modifies the Kamarath and
Sims cases, providing some statutory limits where the judiciary had left
1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1439 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02-.03 (Page
Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.865 (1979); VA. CODE § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1980).
144. Sohns & Fuller, Texas Landlord-Tenant Law and the Sixty-Ffh Legislature, 18 S.
TEX. L.J. 497 (1977).
145. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
146. Id art. 5236c.
147. Id. art. 5236d.
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
149. Id. § 17.45(1).
150. See notes 58, 77 supra.
151. For a detailed description of the bills and their various provisions, see Sohns &
Fuller, supra note 144, at 504-08.
152. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
153. 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
154. Chief Justice Guittard discussed the issue of judicial legislation in his majority opin-
ion in Sims. "The objection is made that this court is engaging in judicial legislation ...
We agree that a well-drawn statute would be a superior solution to this problem for future
cases. Such a solution, however, is not available in this case." He then challenged the legis-
lators: "If legislation is needed to govern future cases of this sort, it may be enacted, regard-
less of this decision." Id at 533.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Akin argued that the court was usurping a legislative function
by declaring the public policy of the state. Id at 533-36.
155. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 780, §§ 1-17, at 1978-84 (codified at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5236f (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981)). The Act passed the house of representatives on
May 4, 1979; the senate approved the bill on May 28, 1979. Due to "[the importance of this
legislation and the crowded condition of the calendar," procedural rules were suspended so




room for interpretation. The statute itself, however, is not without ambi-
guity.
B. Statutory Warranty of Habitability
The Texas Act is limited in its application to residential property. 156
Section 2 of the Act delineates the landlord's duty to make repairs. Upon
actual notice, the landlord 157 must make a "diligent effort to repair or rem-
edy any condition which materially affects the physical health or safety of
an ordinary tenant."' 58 The duty to repair does not extend to repairs ne-
cessitated by actions of the tenant or his family, guests or invitees; it does
embrace conditions caused by normal wear and tear'5 9 that also materially
affect the tenant's physical health or safety.160 The Act does not require a
landlord to furnish utility service if it is not reasonably available,' 6 1 nor
does it mandate security guard protection. 16
2
Under the Act an aggrieved tenant has the right to either judicial or
nonjudicial relief. Before he can avail himself of these remedies, however,
he must comply with the Act's elaborate prerequisites. Initially, the tenant
must be current in his rental payments; if they are in arrears, he is entitled
to no relief. 163 The tenant must then notify the landlord 164 of the defective
condition 165 and allow him a reasonable time to make repairs. 166 The ten-
ant is free to pursue his statutory remedies only if the landlord fails to
156. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Like Texas,
most states have limited the application of the statutory warranty of habitability to residen-
tial leases. But see CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941 (West 1954); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2692-
2693, 2695 (West 1952). The American Law Institute currently takes no position as to
whether a warranty of habitability should be available to a tenant of property leased for
commercial or industrial purposes. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 5.1.
157. "Landlord" is a defined term under the Act, meaning the owner, lessor, or sublessor
of a residential rental unit. For purposes of notice and other communications that may be
necessary, a managing agent, leasing agent, or resident manager is considered the agent of
the landlord. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The
importance of this definitional provision is apparent to the many apartment dwellers who
live in properties owned by out-of-town individuals or business entities. By creating an
agency relationship between landlord and manager, the Act alleviates the difficulties inher-
ent in contacting the absentee landlord and obtaining jurisdiction over him.
158. Id. § 2(a).
159. "Normal wear and tear" is the deterioration that occurs within the scope of the
normal use for which the premises are intended. Id. § 1(e).
160. Id. § 2(b).
161. Id. § 2(c). The Act does not indicate what the landlord's responsibilities may be if
utility lines are readily available.
162. Id.
163. Id § 3(b).
164. Id. § 3(a). A managing agent, leasing agent, or resident manager is considered the
landlord's agent for purposes of notice. Id § 1(a); see note 157 supra.
165. The condition must be one that materially affects the physical health or safety of an
ordinary tenant. Id § 3(c).
166. Id § 3(e). The reasonableness of the time allowed for repairs will depend upon the
nature of the problem and the availability of goods and services necessary to remedy it. Id
The Dallas Tenants' Association suggests that a "reasonable time" might be one day for
such emergencies as backed-up sewage or lack of water and recommends a five-day rule of
thumb in less pressing circumstances. DALLAS TENANTS' NEWS, July-Aug. 1980, at 1.
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make a diligent effort to remedy the condition. 167
The Act makes available to the tenant both judicial and self-help reme-
dies. The tenant may terminate the lease without a court appearance, 68
provided he has complied with all the prerequisites outlined in section 3169
and allowed reasonable time for repairs. 170 In order to terminate his lease
obligations, the tenant must give the landlord written notice that he will
terminate the rental agreement unless the landlord remedies the condition
within seven days. 17  Upon termination of the lease, the tenant may re-
cover both his rent and his security deposit.' 72
The Act provides a number of judicial remedies, and the tenant is enti-
tled to recover under any of them. 73 As with self-help termination, the
tenant must fulfill all of the section 3 requirements prior to seeking judicial
relief. In addition, the tenant must notify the landlord that he will file suit
under the statute unless the landlord remedies the condition within seven
days.' 74 When a tenant institutes a proceeding under the Act, the court
may order specific performance and require the landlord to repair or rem-
edy the condition of the premises.' 75 Rent abatement is another available
remedy by which the court is authorized to reduce rental payments tempo-
rarily in proportion to the diminution in rental value of the defective
premises.' 76 The tenant may be granted actual' 77 or statutory damages 178
as well as court costs and attorneys' fees. 179 The tenant, however, is not
allowed to use breach of the landlord's duty to repair as a defense in an
eviction proceeding.' 80
A separate section of the Act governs insured fire and casualty losses.' 8 '
For damage to the rented premises caused by fire, smoke, hail, explosion,
or similar occurrences, the allowable time period for repairs does not begin
until the landlord receives his insurance proceeds.' 8 2 If the casualty loss
renders the premises totally unusable from a practical standpoint, either
167. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
168. Id § 5.
169. Id § 5(a)(1).
170. Id § 5(a)(2).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 5(b). Pro rata rent refunds are calculated from the date of termination or of
moveout, whichever is later. Id
173. Id § 6.
174. Id
175. Id § 6(a).
176. Id § 6(b). The abatement of rental payments is to continue until the premises are
repaired. Id When coupled with the specific peformance relief of § 6(a), this provision
takes on added significance. The landord is required to repair the premises, and the tenant
is partially relieved of payment responsibilities until he does.
177. Id § 6(d).
178. Id § 6(c). The court is empowered to award a civil penalty of one month's rent plus
$100. Id This provision seems primarily punitive in nature and appears designed for situa-
tions in which the tenant's actual damages are small or difficult to calculate.
179. Id § 6(e). See also id § 10.
180. Id §9.
181. Id § 4.
182. Id § 4(a).
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party is entitled to terminate the lease.' 83 If, however, the premises remain
partially usable, termination is not available; the tenant is limited to the
remedy of rent abatement, for which he must apply to the court.184
C Prohibition of Retaliatory Conduct
The statute prohibits the landlord from taking certain action in retalia-
tion for a tenant's notice to repair a defective condition or the tenant's
exercise of his legal rights under the Act.' 85 For a period of six months
from the date of such tenant action, the landlord may not file eviction pro-
ceedings, 186 deprive the tenant of his use of the premises, decrease the ten-
ant's services, or notify the tenant of a rent increase or termination of the
lease which is to be effective within six months. 87 Violation of this section
entitles the tenant to recover a statutory penalty, 8 8 reasonable moving
costs,' 89 court costs, and attorneys' fees.' 90 Additionally, the Act allows a




The statute lists numerous exceptions to the retaliation section.19 2 The
landlord is free to evict the tenant if he is delinquent in his rent, 9 3 or has
otherwise materially breached the rental agreement. 194 Threats' 95 or in-
tentional property damage 96 by the tenant, his family, guests, or invitees
are also valid grounds for eviction under the Act. Under some circum-
stances the landlord may proceed with eviction proceedings if the tenant
holds over. 197 Finally, increases in rent or decreases in service that are
clearly not induced by retaliatory motives may be allowed.' 98
183. Id. § 4(b). In the case of such termination, the tenant may recover a pro rata refund
of rent as well as his security deposit. Id
184. Id § 4(c).
185. Id. § 7(a).
186. Id § 7(a). But see id § 7(b).
187. Id § 7(a).
188. Id. § 7(d)(l). Statutory damages of one month's rent plus $100 may be awarded to
the tenant who has suffered from retaliation by the landlord. Id
189. Id § 7(d)(2).
190. Id § 7(d)(3). See also id § 10.
191. Id § 9.
192. Id § 7(b).
193. Id. § 7(b)(l). To avoid eviction, the rental payment must be current as of the time
of the landlord's written notice to vacate or as of the time the eviction proceedings are filed.
Id
194. Id § 7(b)(4).
195. Id § 7(b)(3).
196. Id § 7(b)(2).
197. The landlord is free to evict if the tenant holds over after having given notice of his
own intention to vacate. Id § 7(b)(5). Furthermore, if the landlord has given notice to
vacate prior to his actual receipt from the tenant of a repair notice, he may evict the hold-
over tenant. Id § 7(b)(6). Finally, the Act includes a catchall provision for the landlord
that allows him to evict a holdover tenant if he believes that the tenant may affect adversely
the health, safety, quiet enjoyment, or property of the landlord or the other tenants. Id.
§ 7(b)(7).
198. Id § 7(c). Increases or decreases in rent that are made pursuant to an escalation
clause in the rental agreement or as part of a project-wide pattern are not considered retalia-
tory.
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D. Miscellaneous Provisions
While the Texas Act is largely tenant-oriented, it does offer protections
for the landlord as well. The Act gives the landlord a cause of action for
retaliatory rent withholding. If the tenant withholds a rental payment in
retaliation for the landlord's failure to repair the condition of the premises,
the landlord may recover a statutory penalty of one month's rent plus
$100.199 In addition, the Act relieves the landlord of his statutory respon-
sibilities if he decides to demolish or close the rental premises. 2°°
Section 13 of the Act contains three sentences that are among the most
important in the entire statute:
The provisions of this Act may not be waived except where the rental
agreement is in writing and the waiver is underlined or in bold print
in the rental agreement or in a separate written addendum. Such
waiver must be specific and must list with clarity what duties are be-
ing waived. Such waiver must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and
for consideration. 20 1
The section allows the parties to the lease agreement to bargain with the
legal protections that the Act establishes. The possibility of a waiver ar-
guably works to the landlord's advantage. 20 2
Section 14 of the Act provides that the statutory duties and remedies are
intended to supersede and replace existing common law and statutory law
that govern habitability and retaliatory eviction.20 3 The Act expressly pre-
serves, however, the contractual rights of both landlord and tenant.20
Section 14 also clarifies the limited scope of the Act, noting that the statute
does not affect actions for personal injury and property damage. 20 5 Thus,
common law doctrines and statutory remedies currently in force remain
valid in these actions.
IV. TOWARD THE FUTURE: SUGGESTED INTERPRETATIONS
AND REFORM
The enactment of article 5236f significantly altered the landlord-tenant
relationship in Texas by codifying the contemporary concepts of retalia-
tory eviction and implied warranty.2°6 Litigation is certain to arise from a
number of the Act's provisions that lend themselves to more than one in-
terpretation. The following portion of this Comment addresses areas of
potential conflict, as well as those areas that arguably are in need of legis-
lative alteration.
The most ambiguous language in the new law appears in one of its key
199. Id § 8.
200. Id § 12.
201. Id. § 13.
202. See notes 228-35 infra and accompanying text.
203. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
204. Id
205. Id
206. The Act applies only to residential rental agreements executed, renewed, or ex-
tended after Sept. 1, 1979. Id § 17.
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sections. Section 2,207 which delineates the landlord's duty to repair leased
premises, extends that obligation to "any condition which materially affects
the physical health or safety of an ordinary tenant. ' 20 8 The language of
section 2 is certain to form the subject matter of future litigation because of
the ambiguity of the phrase "materially affects."' 20 9 One possible guide to
an interpretation of the language may be found in Kamarath v. Bennett,210
in which the Texas Supreme Court outlined eight factors to be used in
determining whether the landlord had breached the implied warranty of
habitability.211 The use of these factors, while not a complete solution,
could provide a measure of guidance in defining the statutory language.212
The intricate procedural aspects of the Texas Act may prove burden-
some to the average urban tenant. Especially onerous are the notice provi-
sions, which require "double notice" to the landlord before the tenant may
exercise his statutory rights. Before the landlord's duty to repair will arise,
the tenant must provide him with written notice of the defective condition
of the premises. 213 The Act requires a second notification prior to the ten-
ant's self-help termination of the lease 214 or resort to the judicial pro-
cess. 215 The "double notice" requirement serves no apparent purpose
because the goal of notifying the landlord may be accomplished in one
simple step.2 16 The "double notice" provisions present a procedural trap
207. Id § 2.
208. Id (emphasis added).
209. The Dallas Tenants' Association and the Greater Dallas Community Relations
Commission have made an effort to provide guidance to tenants by enumerating examples
of such "material" conditions. They suggest that defective wiring or plumbing, leaks, holes,
infestation of vermin, lack of heat or hot water, and unsafe stairways constitute conditions
that materially affect health and safety. Violations of city housing, fire, and health codes
also would fall in this category. Items such as the condition of the carpet, unsatisfactory
draperies, and nonfunctioning appliances would not. DALLAS TENANTS' ASSOCIA-
TION/GREATER DAI.LAS COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE TENANT HANDBOOK
5, 8 (obtainable at 3525 State Street, Dallas, Texas 75204).
210. 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978).
211. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
212. While the URLTA also uses the "materially affecting health and safety" language,
it goes on to list a number of specific landlord duties. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
AND TENANT AcT § 2.104. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra. In Park West Man-
agement Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 992 (1979), housing conditions were adversely affected by a strike of the building
service employees' union. Garbage removal and janitorial services were interrupted by the
strike, and some of the tenants refused to pay rent. When the landlord sued for nonpay-
ment, the tenants counterclaimed for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. They
ultimately were awarded a rent reduction for the breach. While the landlord argued that the
warranty would not be violated unless the deprivation rendered the premises uninhabitable
and dangerous, hazardous, or detrimental to the tenants' health and safety, the New York
Court of Appeals disagreed. The court found that the conditions that existed during the
strike were serious enough to constitute a health emergency. Id at 329, 391 N.E.2d at 1295,
418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
213. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
214. Id § 5(a)(2).
215. Id § 6.
216. The URLTA endorses a one-step notice procedure. Under the URLTA, the tenant
lists in his notice to the landlord the acts and omissions which constitute a breach of the
statutory warranty of habitability. The notice may also state that the rental agreement will
terminate within 30 days unless the breach of warranty is corrected within 14 days. UNI-
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for the unwary tenant who neglects to fulfill the second portion of the re-
quirement.217
The remedies authorized under the Texas statute for breach of the im-
plied warranty are of particular concern to tenants. One of the most signif-
icant provisions of the Act is the availability of specific performance. 218
By directly requiring the landlord to repair the alleged defects, specific
performance achieves decent housing more effectively than the economic
sanction of rent reduction. 219 Tenants should be encouraged to seek both
specific performance and rent abatement to maximize the relief that the
statute affords.220
A number of weaknesses are apparent, however, with respect to the stat-
utory remedies. While the Act provides for nonjudicial termination of the
lease by the tenant, it fails to address the question of moving expenses.221
FORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.101. No additional notice is required
prior to filing suit under the Uniform Act. See id §§ 4.102, .104.
217. The following are forms proposed for use by Texas tenants to satisfy the notice
requirements of the Act. They are adapted from R. BLUMBERG & J. GROw, THE RIGHTS OF
TENANTS 170-71 (1978). The tenant always should keep a copy of any communication sent
to the landlord.
FORM 1: NOTICE OF DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS (date)
To ---___. 4 a., .. , landlord of premises located at (street name. number.
unit number, city. and state)
Certain defective conditions and/or housing code violations exist at the
premises named above. These conditions materially affect my physical health
and safety and are a violation of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f. The
conditions are:
I would appreciate your repair of these conditions as soon as possible. If
they are not remedied within a reasonable time, I intend to exercise fully my
rights under Texas law, which entitles me to terminate the lease or seek dam-
ages, specific performance, and rent abatement.
Thank you for your cooperation.
(tenant)
FORM 2: NOTICE OF INTENTION TO PURSUE STATUTORY
REMEDIES (date)
To (nam).., landlord of premises located at (street name number.
unit number, city. and state).
The defective conditions of which you were notified on (date of first
notic) remain unrepaired. Unless the condition is repaired or remedied
within seven days, I intend to (check one):
terminate the rental agreement
file suit under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 6.
(tnan)
218. Even the URLTA does not require the landlord to make repairs. See UNIFORM
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 4.101-.107.
219. For commentary advocating the equitable remedy of specific performance for
breach of the implied warranty, see Blumberg & Robbins, supra note 104, at 26-30.
220. See note 176 supra.
221. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Appar-
ently the tenant must seek judicial relief under § 6 of the Act in order to recover his moving
expenses as "actual damages." See id § 6(d).
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Due to the difficulty and expense of seeking substitute housing and mov-
ing, few tenants are likely to avail themselves of this otherwise attractive
remedy.
The issue of rent withholding is another possible problem area. The Act
requires the tenant to be current in his rent prior to the exercise of his
statutory rights.222 Additionally, the Act enables the landlord to sue the
tenant if he withholds rent in retaliation for nonrepair. 223 The statutory
language is clear and appears to be unavoidable. In contrast, a Michigan
court has held that a breach of a statutory covenant to repair may excuse
payment of rent under a similar statute.224 The result follows from a the-
ory that covenants in a lease are mutually dependent; the breach of a cove-
nant by one party relieves the other party of his responsibility to perform.
A major shortcoming of the Act is the prohibition against defensive use
of the warranty of habitability.225 The URLTA allows the use of the war-
ranty as a defense in an eviction action for nonpayment of rent, 226 and
other states have interpreted their statutes to allow for defensive use of the
warranty 227 The requirement that the tenant take the initiative by insti-
tuting legal proceedings may prevent indigent plaintiffs from exercising
their statutory rights. This area requires legislative action; in order to ef-
fectuate the purposes of landlord-tenant reform, breach of the statutory
warranty should be allowed as a defense in possessory proceedings.
Waiver is another of the primary issues raised by the terms of the Texas
statute.228 By allowing the parties to the lease to waive their statutory obli-
gations, the Act provides "a ready means for emasculating the effect of its
own intricately-crafted provisions. '' 229 Within months after the Kamarath
decision, the Texas Apartment Association had developed new standard-
ized lease forms containing a waiver of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. 230 In order to comply with the terms of the statute, the waiver must be
222. Id. § 3(b).
223. Id. § 8.
224. See Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972) (construing 1968
Mich. Pub. Acts 297 (repealed 1972)).
225. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The Act
does provide, however, for a defense based upon retaliatory eviction in a landlord's action
for possession. Id; see note 191 supra and accompanying text.
226. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105.
227. See Steinegger v. Rosario, 35 Conn. Supp. 151, 402 A.2d I (Super. Ct. 1979) (con-
struing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-4 (1979)); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339
(1973) (construing MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 504.18, 566.07 (1947 & Supp. 1981)). In Fritz the
court articulated a persuasive policy argument, noting that the legislative purpose in enact-
ing the statutory covenants would be frustrated if a landlord could regain possession of the
premises in spite of his failure to fulfill his obligations. The tenant would have little choice
in asserting his statutory right to habitable housing if his only alternatives were abandon-
ment or continued payment of rent to which the landlord is not entitled because of the
defective condition of the premises. 213 N.W.2d at 342.
228. See notes 201-02 supra and accompanying text.
229. Raines, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 43, 108 (1980).
230. Note, Recognition of an Implied Covenant of Habitability in Residential Leaseholds:
Kamarath v. Bennett, 32 Sw. L. 1037, 1042 n.41 (1978). Such a waiver typically reads as
follows: "By accepting the premises ... resident accepts the apartment and furnishings, if
any, as is, and hereby expressly waives any warranty of habitability of the premises .. "
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underlined or printed in boldface and must be contained in a written
rental agreement or other written document.231 While this requirement is
easily disposed of by the use of a boilerplate clause, the other provisions
may be more difficult to embody in a form lease. The waiver must "list
with clarity" the duties that are being waived and must be made "know-
ingly, voluntarily and for consideration. ' 232 These specifications may offer
a tenant grounds for avoidance of a waiver clause because few tenants are
likely to receive consideration in exchange for accepting the waiver. The
question of the "voluntariness" of the tenant's acceptance of such a waiver
in the light of current housing conditions must be considered. The urban
tenant ordinarily is not in a position to negotiate the terms of a printed
form lease. Such a lease therefore may resemble an adhesion contract,
susceptible to invalidation as an unconscionable agreement. 233 The
URLTA forbids the inclusion of an express waiver in a rental agree-
ment, 234 providing instead a limited set of circumstances under which the
landlord and tenant may enter into a separate agreement that alters their
mutual obligations. 235 The legislature should reconsider this portion of the
Act in light of the relative bargaining positions of the lessor and lessee
under current and projected housing availability.
With respect to the retaliatory action section of the statute, several addi-
tional problems arise, including the limited number of tenant activities
that are protected under the Act. The statute protects only the tenant's
notice to repair and his exercise of legal remedies. 236 The most notable
omission is that of tenant unionization or organization, which is covered
A copy of a sample lease can be obtained from the Citadel Apartments, 5936 East Lovers
Lane, Dallas, Texas 75206, a member of the Texas Apartment Association.
231. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 13 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
232. Id
233. Ordinarily the parties to a lease should be allowed to allocate their rights and re-
sponsibilities. Often, however, the tenant is in a weak bargaining position. A waiver of the
tenant's rights, particularly in a form lease, may not be a product of an arm's-length bar-
gaining position. Under these circumstances, the contract doctrine of unconscionability may
be held to apply to the provisions of a form lease. See U.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 234 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). See also Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In several decisions courts have adopted
this view in order to void onerous provisions in a lease. See Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81
Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland Cty. Ct. 1975) (clause requiring tenant to pay
landlord's attorneys' fees in default proceeding found unconscionable); Seabrook v. Com-
muter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972) (clause requiring
tenant to maintain lease obligations even if premises remain uncompleted on date of com-
mencement of lease found unconscionable when buried in a 10,000-word lease); Tai On
Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 A.D.2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1970) (landlord's raising of rent
from $400 to $2000 per month under agreement that landlord could fix rent held uncon-
scionable), appeal dismissed, 29 N.Y.2d 747, 276 N.E.2d 234, 326 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1971).
The concept of unconscionability suffers from imprecision. For a list of factors that the
courts may consider, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, § 5.6, Comment e.
234. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.403.
235. Id § 2.104(c); see note 109 supra and accompanying text.
236. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 7(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Courts in
other states have narrowly interpreted similar provisions. See Clore v. Fredman, 59 IUI. 2d
20, 319 N.E.2d 18 (1974); Seidelman v. Kouvavus, 57 Il. App. 3d 350, 373 N.E.2d 53 (1978).
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by the URLTA. 237 Other retaliatory conduct that should be included is
the landlord's failure to allow renewal of a lease. 238
Furthermore, the Act provides the landlord with an undue number of
escape provisions that enable him to avoid liability for conduct that is re-
taliatory in nature.239 While some of these exceptions to the retaliation
section are valid, such as those that deal with nonpayment of rent and
intentional property damages, others are purely gratuitous. Particularly
burdensome to the tenant is section 7(b)(7), which allows the landlord to
continue with eviction if he holds a "good faith belief' that the tenant may
harm the quiet enjoyment, health, safety, or property of those in and on
the premises.24° This sweeping language gives landlords a catchall provi-
sion with which to protect themselves.
A final difficulty inherent in the retaliation legislation is proof of the
landlord's retaliatory motive. Although the Texas law provides that the
landlord may not institute eviction proceedings within six months of a pro-
tected tenant activity,241 the provision arguably postpones rather than alle-
viates the potential problems of proof. The adoption of a standard of "just
cause eviction" might solve this and other problems involved in imple-
menting the retaliatory action statute. The procedure places the burden of
proof on the landlord who is seeking to evict his tenant and requires him to
present the reasons for his conduct as part of his cause of action. Such a
scheme provides the tenant with a security of tenure that is not afforded by
retaliatory eviction prohibitions.242
V. CONCLUSION
The common law of Texas, like that of most other American jurisdic-
tions, provided few safeguards for the residential tenant. Under the strict
rule of caveat emptor the lessee was bound to accept the leased premises as
the landlord presented them to him. The use of a number of judicial ex-
ceptions and the recognition of the implied covenant of habitability gradu-
ally modified and eventually abrogated the harsh doctrine. Development
237. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 5.101(a)(3). The tenant-
plaintiff in Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no
writ), had been instrumental in organizing a group of his fellow tenants.
238. See Clore v. Fredman, 59 Ill. 2d 20, 319 N.E.2d 18 (1974).
239. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 7(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see notes
192-98 supra and accompanying text.
240. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f, § 7(b)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
241. Id § 7(a)(l). Statutes of a number of states create a presumption of retaliatory
intent when landlord action occurs within a specified time period. These include: ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516 (1975); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 562A.36 (West Supp. 1980-1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.705 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 70-
24-431 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540:13-a, -b (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42.10.10, .12 (West Supp. 1980-1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.240, .250
(Supp. 1981). The URLTA includes a similar provision. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LAND-
LORD AND TENANT ACT § 5.101(b).
242. The security of tenure/just cause eviction theory is discussed in Blumberg & Rob-
bins, supra note 104, at 39-44.
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of the twin concepts of implied warranty and retaliatory eviction provided
the tenant with the leverage to help equalize the historic disparity in bar-
gaining power between the landlord and tenant.
Judicial recognition of the tenant-oriented reforms of implied warranty
and retaliatory eviction eventually led to legislative action. The drafting of
the Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, which a number of juris-
dictions adopted, heightened the awareness of the need for statutory revi-
sion. Other states, including Texas, enacted their own original landlord-
tenant statutes.
The Texas Act obviously is a creature of legislative compromise. Lack-
ing the cohesiveness of the URLTA and a number of the other state stat-
utes, the Texas Act contains provisions both onerous and beneficial to
tenants. For example, both the "double notice" requirement of the Act
and the prohibition of defensive use of the statutory warranty are particu-
larly burdensome to the lessee. Yet the Texas Act allows for specific per-
formance of the landlord's statutory duty to repair, a form of relief that the
URLTA does not yet allow. In addition to its unsystematic approach, the
Act is unnecessarily intricate and procedurally complex. The elaborate
prerequisites for obtaining judicial relief under the statute inhibit their ex-
ercise by the class they were designed to protect.
Most importantly, the Act provides far too many escapes for the shrewd
landlord. The statute not only allows waiver of all the responsibilities that
it creates, but it also provides the mechanics for accomplishing the waiver.
In addition, it exempts a number of landlord activities from the scope of its
retaliatory conduct protection. Such provisions undercut the substantive
benefits that the statute affords.
While article 5236f represents a noteworthy attempt by the Texas Legis-
lature to modify existing statutory landlord-tenant law, its numerous short-
comings render it far less helpful than it might be. The legislature should
consider amending the statute to grant more and stronger protections for
the growing number of Texas tenants. Without such revision, the statute
fails to reach the goals of safe and adequate housing.
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